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Volume 5: Issue 1
 Pre-1972 Sound Recordings: Why Does the Law Treat 
Them Diff erently?
June M. Besek*
I. Iඇඍඋඈൽඎർඍංඈඇ
Pre-1972 sound recordings are treated diff erently under the law from other works of 
authorship. For historical reasons, they are protected only under state law, not federal 
copyright law, until 2067, when they will fall into the public domain.1 Because the scope 
of rights and exceptions in these recordings varies from state to state, it is often diffi  cult 
to make judgments about permissible uses. Moreover, as exploitation of sound recordings 
moves from the sale of copies (or phonorecords, as they are referred to under federal 
law) to streaming, pre-1972 sound recordings are increasingly deprived of the benefi ts of 
exploitation, for reasons discussed below.
These pre-1972 recordings cover a wide range of material. The commercial recordings 
come most readily to mind including Louis Armstrong, Glen Miller, Frank Sinatra, Elvis 
Presley, the Supremes, and many more jazz, classical, blues, folk and pop recordings, as 
well as spoken word recordings such as audio books or lectures. But there are also many 
recordings that were not made for commercial distribution and are technically unpublished, 
such as archival copies of radio programs, oral histories, reporters’ notes, recordings made 
for research on everything from bird calls to indigenous music, and so on. Some of these 
recordings may have signifi cant commercial value; others have value only to researchers in 
niche areas.
The U.S. Copyright Offi  ce has recommended that pre-1972 sound recordings be brought 
under federal copyright law. 2 Although such a move potentially raises issues of takings 
* Executive Director, Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts and Lecturer-in-Law, Columbia Law 
School.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1998).
2. Rൾ඀ංඌඍൾඋ ඈൿ Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍඌ, U.S. Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ Oൿൿංർൾ, Fൾൽൾඋൺඅ Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ Pඋඈඍൾർඍංඈඇ ൿඈඋ Pඋൾ-1972 
Sඈඎඇൽ Rൾർඈඋൽංඇ඀ඌ (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf [herein-
after Copyright Offi  ce Report].  The author of this article served as a consultant to the U.S. Copyright Offi  ce in 
connection with the Copyright Offi  ce Report.
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under the Fifth Amendment, 3 most of these issues could be addressed by carefully drafting 
the new statute. On balance, bringing pre-1972 sound recordings under federal law could 
provide greater certainty and fairness to the use and exploitation of these works by right 
holders, scholars and consumers.
II.  Bൺർ඄඀උඈඎඇൽ
A sound recording is a work that results from the fi xation of a series of musical, spoken 
or other sounds, regardless of how embodied.4 A music CD, for example, is a sound 
recording, as is the digital version of the same work on a hard drive. A sound recording can 
embody two or more works – the fi xation of sounds and the underlying musical or literary 
work(s). Each may be entitled to a separate copyright.
Sound recordings have been in existence for more than 150 years.5 Until 1972, sound 
recordings were not eligible for protection under federal copyright law. This stemmed in 
part from a 1908 case in which the Supreme Court held that piano rolls were not “copies” 
of the underlying musical work, because the musical work could not be visually discerned 
from the piano roll.6 One unfortunate consequence of this ruling was that the mechanical 
means by which sound recordings were embodied could not serve as a copy for purposes 
of fi xation, because one could not discern the sounds sought to be protected merely with 
the senses. 7 Since fi xation is an essential element of copyright protection, that decision 
presented an obstacle to federal copyright protection for sound recordings.8 Any copyright 
protection that sound recordings enjoyed prior to 1972 stemmed from state laws.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, unauthorized copying of sound recordings became cheaper 
and easier, and large scale commercial infringement became more common.9 In 1971 
Congress was persuaded that federal copyright protection for sound recordings was urgent.10 
3. The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Cඈඇඌඍ. 
ൺආൾඇൽ. V. 
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
5. Copyright Offi  ce Report, supra note 2, at 50.
6. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), superseded by statute, Copyrights Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). See Copyright Offi  ce Report, supra note 2, at 8. 
7. This was explicitly changed in the 1976 Copyright Act; the law currently provides that a “copy” is a “ma-
terial object[] . . . in which a work is fi xed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the 
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device. . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
8. See Barbara A. Ringer, Study No. 26: The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings, in Sඎൻർඈආආ. 
Oඇ Pൺඍൾඇඍඌ, Tඋൺൽൾආൺඋ඄ඌ, ൺඇൽ Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ ඈൿ ඍඁൾ Cඈආආ. Oඇ ඍඁൾ Jඎൽංർංൺඋඒ, 86ඍඁ Cඈඇ඀., Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ Lൺඐ 
Rൾඏංඌංඈඇ එං, 4-7 (Comm. Print Feb. 1957), available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/study26.pdf. 
9. H.R. Rൾඉ. Nඈ. 92-487, at 2 (1971).
10. Id. at 4. In addition, certain Supreme Court decisions had cast doubt on the validity of state law protec-
tion. H.R. Rൾඉ. Nඈ. 92-487 ൺඍ 2-3, 12-13.
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On October 15, 1971, Congress passed the Sound Recording Act, eff ective February 15, 
1972, which brought sound recordings into the Copyright Act on a going-forward basis.11 All 
sound recordings created on or after that date became eligible for protection under federal 
copyright law. All sound recordings created earlier remained under state law.
In 1976 Congress completed a comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act. It brought 
all unpublished works of authorship under federal copyright law (previously the federal 
copyright law protected only published works) to create a unitary system of copyright.12 
Nevertheless, it left pre-1972 sound recordings under state law13. To ensure that these works 
would not be protected indefi nitely into the future, Congress provided that states could 
continue to protect pre-1972 sound recordings until the end of 2047, at which point all 
protection for these pre-1972 sound recordings would cease – in other words, they would 
never be entitled to federal protection.14 This deadline was later extended to 2067.15 
III.  Fൾൽൾඋൺඅ Pඋඈඍൾർඍංඈඇ ൿඈඋ Sඈඎඇൽ Rൾർඈඋൽංඇ඀ඌ
Even though pre-1972 sound recordings are not protected by federal copyright law, 16 it 
is important to understand the scope of federal rights in recordings that are protected. This 
background will facilitate the comparison between the scope of protection under state and 
federal law for sound recordings, and illustrate how the regime of protection would change 
for pre-1972 recordings if they were brought under federal copyright law. It also serves to 
11. Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). The law was passed on October 15, 1971, and went into 
eff ect four months later, on February 15, 1972. 
12. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012).
13. See id. § 301(c). 
14. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) currently states: 
With respect to sound recordings fi xed before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under the common 
law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2067. The preemp-
tive provisions of subsection (a) shall apply to any such rights and remedies pertaining to any cause of action 
arising from undertakings commenced on and after February 15, 2067. Notwithstanding the provisions of 
section 303, no sound recording fi xed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to copyright under this title 
before, on, or after February 15, 2067.
As passed in 1976, the legislation provided that state laws would not be preempted until February 15, 2047, 
but that date was extended to February 15, 2067 by the Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 
Title I, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
15. See Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298. 
16. Certain foreign pre-1972 sound recordings are protected under federal copyright law as a result of the 
1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4973-81. To comply with U.S. 
treaty obligations, that law restored federal copyright protection in certain foreign works that were in the public 
domain for lack of compliance with U.S. formalities such as copyright notice and renewal. It also provided 
protection for certain foreign sound recordings still protected in their home countries, even though the record-
ings would not have been entitled to federal copyright protection had they had been published in the United 
States in the fi rst instance. Restoration occurred automatically on January 1, 1996 for most works. 17 U.S.C. § 
104A(h)(2) (2002). Restored works are protected for the remainder of the term they would have been granted 
had they not entered the public domain.
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illustrate the diff erences between state law protection for pre-1972 sound recordings and the 
federal copyright protection available to the works – for example, musical compositions or 
literary works – that underlie those recordings. 
A. Rights Provided by Copyright.
In general, copyright consists of a “bundle” of rights, including:
1. The reproduction right (the right to make copies and phonorecords). 17
A copyright owner can decide whether or not to make copies or license others to do 
so, and on what terms. 18 A copy of a sound recording is known as a “phonorecord,”19 but 
because the state courts do not use this terminology, this article will refer to reproductions 
of sound recordings as copies.
2. The right to create adaptations (also known as “derivative works”).20 
Sound recordings have a narrower “derivative work” right than do other copyrighted 
works. Merely imitating the sounds in a recording does not infringe the original. The 
derivative work is infringing only if it contains actual sounds from the protected work.21
3. The right to distribute copies of the work to the public.22
This right is limited by the “fi rst sale doctrine” which provides that the owner of a 
particular copy of a copyrighted work that was lawfully made may sell or otherwise transfer 
that copy without the authority of the copyright owner.23
4. The right to perform the work publicly.24
Performing a work “publicly” means to perform it anywhere that is open to the public or 
anywhere that a “substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its 
social acquaintances is gathered.”25 Transmitting the performance or display to such a place 
also makes it public, regardless of whether members of the public receive the performance 
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1) (2002).
18. Sound recordings have an exclusive reproduction right like most other works; musical compositions, in 
contrast, are subject to a statutory license in respect to their reproduction and distribution after the initial re-
cording of the composition. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
20. See id. §106(2).
21. See id. § 114(b) (2010).
22. See id. § 106(3).
23. See id. § 109(a) (2008).
24. See id. § 106(4).
25. See id. § 101.
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at the same time or diff erent times, at the same place or diff erent places.26 For example, a 
radio broadcast is a public performance, even if each member of the audience listens to it in 
her own home. Transmitting performances or displays of a copyrighted work to the public 
over the Internet is a public performance or display of the work.27 
Sound recording copyright owners have a narrower right of public performance than 
do those of other works; specifi cally, they have the right “to perform the work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission,” as described below.28 Analog transmission is not 
restricted by copyright.29 In broad brush, the law sets up a three-tiered system of protection 
for performances of sound recordings.30 The fi rst tier consists of certain types of public 
performances that are exempt from the performance right and may be made for free, such 
as “live” performances of sound recordings at public venues (such as discos) and analog 
transmissions.31 
The second tier encompasses certain digital audio transmissions subject to a compulsory 
license. The sound recording copyright owner may not prevent these public performances, 
but the transmitting party must pay royalties to the sound recording copyright owner and 
performers at the rate set by the Copyright Royalty Board.32 
26. Id.
27. See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).
29. Many bills have been introduced in Congress to require terrestrial broadcasters to pay performance roy-
alties to artists and record companies, but so far none has been successful. See, e.g., Performance Rights Act, 
S. 2500, 110th Cong. (2007) and H.R. 4789, 110th Cong. (2007). 
30. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336, amend-
ed by Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2899 (1998) (codifi ed 
at 17 U.S.C. § 114).
31. Also included in this fi rst tier are traditional AM and FM broadcasts, public radio, background music ser-
vices, and performances and transmissions in business establishments such as stores and restaurants. 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 106(6), 114(b), (d)(1). Although use of the sound recording may be free, it may still be necessary to pay 
license fees for the underlying work. 
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2). Those royalties are distributed to recording companies and performers by an 
organization called SoundExchange. The performances in the “second tier” include subscription digital trans-
missions (i.e., those limited to paying recipients) and certain eligible nonsubscription digital transmissions. A 
transmission may be made pursuant to the compulsory license if it (a) is not in the fi rst tier (in which case a 
license is unnecessary because it is exempt), (b) is accompanied, if feasible, with the title, name of copyright 
owner and other information concerning the sound recording and underlying musical work, and (c) the trans-
mitting party meets a number of specifi c statutory requirements that diminish the risk that the transmissions 
will be copied or will substitute for having copies, e.g., it does not publish its program in advance, does not 
play more than a specifi ed number of selections by a particular performer or from a particular phonorecord 
within a specifi ed time period, does not seek to evade these conditions by causing receivers to automatically 
switch program channels, etc. See also Rൾ඀ංඌඍൾඋ ඈൿ Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍඌ, U.S. Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ Oൿൿංർൾ, Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ ൺඇൽ 
ඍඁൾ Mඎඌංർ Mൺඋ඄ൾඍඉඅൺർൾ 56 (Feb. 2015), available at http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/copy-
right-and-the-music-marketplace.pdf
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Finally, the third tier consists of certain digital audio transmissions that fall neither 
under the exemption (fi rst tier) nor the compulsory license (second tier) and thus require 
negotiating a license with the copyright owner. These are performances such as interactive 
digital audio services (on-demand streaming).33
5.  The right to display the work publicly.34
The owner of a lawfully made copy is entitled to display the work publicly to viewers 
present where the copy is located.35
Copyright Exceptions. The Copyright Act contains many exceptions and limitations to 
the rights outlined above, spelled out largely in sections 107 to 122 of the Act. Among those 
exceptions are fair use,36 exceptions for libraries and archives under certain circumstances to 
copy works in their collections for their own use (for preservation or replacement) or upon 
the request of a user,37 and 
educational exceptions for face-to-face classroom use and distance education.38
Term of Protection. The duration of copyright protection in the United States diff ers 
depending on when the work was created and published. For works fi rst created on or after 
January 1, 1978 (the eff ective date of the 1976 Copyright Act), copyright lasts for the life of 
the author plus seventy years.39 For anonymous and pseudonymous works and works made 
for hire, the term is 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation (whichever expires 
fi rst). 40 Works created but not published before January 1, 1978 were given the same term as 
works created on or after January 1, 1978.41 
For works fi rst published prior to January 1, 1978, the rules are complicated, but 
33. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(d)(2), (3), (4)(A). This category also includes nonsubscription transmissions that 
do not meet the conditions for the compulsory license (second tier) because, for example, the transmitting par-
ty publishes the program in advance, or does not abide by the limitations concerning the number of selections 
from a particular phonorecord or performer that can be played in a specifi ed time period.
34. See id. § 106(5).
35. See id. § 109(c). The display may be direct or “by the projection of no more than one image at a time.” 
The display right is not of particular relevance to sound recordings.
36. See id. § 107 (1992).
37. See id. § 108 (2005).
38. See id § 110(1), (2) (2005).
39. See id. § 302(a) (1998).   
40. See id. § 302(c).   A “work made for hire” is a work created by an employee in the course of his or her 
employment, or a commissioned work where the commissioning party and the creator agree in a signed writ-
ing that the product will be a work make for hire. Only certain categories of works are eligible to be commis-
sioned works made for hire. 17 U.S.C. §101. 
41. See id. § 303(a) (2010). All works created but still unpublished at January 1, 1978, no matter how old, 
were protected under federal copyright law until at least December 31, 2002. If the work was published be-
tween January 1, 1978 and December 31, 2002, its term of protection will not end until December 31, 2047. 
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specifi cally with respect to sound recordings, those published from 1972-77 are protected 
for 95 years from publication.42
IV.  Pඋඈඍൾർඍංඈඇ ൿඈඋ Sඈඎඇൽ Rൾർඈඋൽංඇ඀ඌ Uඇൽൾඋ Sඍൺඍൾ Lൺඐ
Pre-1972 sound recordings are governed by a patchwork of laws that vary in nature and 
scope from state to state.43 Almost all states have criminal laws that prohibit the reproduction 
and public distribution of these recordings.44 On the civil side, some states have civil statutes 
specifi cally aimed at unlawful use of pre-1972 sound recordings.45 Others rely on common 
law torts: “common law copyright,” unfair competition, misappropriation and the like.46 In 
some states, there have been no reported decisions addressing civil protection for pre-1972 
sound recordings, so it is hard to predict how suits will be resolved other than by relying on 
general principles of unfair competition. 47
A 2005 decision in New York, Capitol Records v. Naxos, demonstrated the potential 
breadth of state law protection for sound recordings. 48 The case involved recordings made 
abroad that had fallen into the public domain in their home country. Plaintiff  claimed those 
recordings nevertheless remained protected under New York state law. The New York Court 
of Appeals, the highest court in New York, agreed. It held that in New York, such recordings 
are covered by “common law copyright” rather than by unfair competition or another tort. 
This holding was signifi cant because common law copyright is a broader form of 
protection. Unfair competition or misappropriation sometimes require a competitive injury 
or bad faith (there is some variation from state to state), but the New York Court of Appeals 
made clear that neither was a requirement for infringement of common law copyright.49 
This holding raised particular concerns for libraries and archives seeking to preserve pre-
1972 sound recordings and make them available for research or study, because without the 
requirements of intent or bad faith, it is possible for nonprofi t users to be liable.
42. See id.
43. See Copyright Offi  ce Report, supra note 2, at 20-49. 
44. Id. at 20-28.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 30-43.
47. June M. Besek, Copyright and Related Issues Relevant to Digital Preservation and Dissemination of Un-
published Pre-1972 Sound Recordings by Libraries and Archives 37-39 (CLIR and Library of Congress 2009). 
States may protect unpublished sound recordings under common law copyright, even if they impose a diff erent 
regime of protection on published sound recordings. Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, 
Washington College of Law, American University (under the supervision of Peter Jaszi with the assistance of 
Nick Lewis), Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Under State Law and Its Impact on Use by Nonprofi t 
Institutions: A 10-State Analysis 15-16 (CLIR and Library of Congress 2009) [hereinafter Jaszi Report].
48. Capitol Records, Inc., v. Naxos of America, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005).
49. Id. at 266.
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V.  Cඈආඉൺඋංඌඈඇ ඈൿ Fൾൽൾඋൺඅ ൺඇൽ Sඍൺඍൾ Pඋඈඍൾർඍංඈඇ50
A. Rights.
Most reported state cases deal with unauthorized commercial duplication and distribution 
of sound recordings; it is apparent that these rights are recognized under state law.51 There is 
some support for the existence of a derivative work right under state law, but too few cases 
to establish whether it can be considered similar in scope to the derivative work right under 
federal law.52
In general, states do not appear to recognize a right of public performance in pre-1972 
sound recordings, 53 and a few states restrict such a right by statute.54 Such recordings are 
regularly played, broadcast and streamed without a performing rights license.55 Federally 
protected sound recordings were accorded a right of public performance only in 1995, and 
then only with respect to certain digital audio transmissions.56 
Both federal and state-protected sound recordings continue to be performed on the radio 
and live without payment, but federal law provides compensation for sound recording 
owners for Internet streaming.57 Owners of pre-1972 sound recordings would like to be 
similarly compensated. Recently several lawsuits have been brought against Pandora and 
Sirius XM, seeking to establish a requirement under the laws of various states that those 
entities pay for streaming pre-1972 sound recordings.58 
50. This article merely highlights the principal diff erences that might bear on the takings issues. A detailed 
comparison between state and federal law protection is beyond the scope of this article.
51. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 341 A.2d 348 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1975); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Ct. App. 1969).
52. For example, in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, the New York Court of Appeals rejected 
Naxos’s claim that its remastering of the Capitol recordings to enhance sound quality resulted in “new prod-
ucts” that did not infringe the originals, since the remastered recordings still utilized elements of the original 
recordings. Supra, note 48, at 267. 
53. See, e.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1940). But see Flo & Eddie Inc. v. 
Sirius XM Radio Inc., CV 13-5693 PSG (RZx), 2014 WL 4725382 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014), discussed infra.
54. E.g., N.C. Gൾඇ. Sඍൺඍ. Aඇඇ. § 66-28 (Wൾඌඍ 2014); S.C. Cඈൽൾ Aඇඇ. § 39-3-510 (1962).
55. See U.S. Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ Oൿൿංർൾ, Tඋൺඇඌർඋංඉඍ ඈൿ Pඋൾ-1972 Sඈඎඇൽ Rൾർඈඋൽංඇ඀ඌ Pඎൻඅංർ Mൾൾඍංඇ඀ 167-68 
(June 2, 2011) (comments of David Oxenford), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/meeting/
transcript-06-02-2011.pdf; see generally Comments of Sirius XM Radio in response to Copyright Offi  ce No-
tice of Inquiry on Federal Copyright Protection of Sound Recordings Fixed Before Feb. 15, 1972, Docket No. 
2010-4 (Apr. 13, 2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/comments/reply/.
56. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995); 
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 111, 119, 801-03 (2006).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (2012).
58. E.g., SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 1:13CV1290 (RJL), 2014 WL 4219591 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 26, 2014) (alleging that Sirius withheld from SoundExchange royalties owed for the performance of pre-
1972 sound recordings, in violation of §§ 112 and 114 of the Copyright Act).
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In the fi rst such case to be decided, Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., a federal 
district court in California held that California provides a full right of public performance 
for pre-1972 sound recordings.59 That ruling will be discussed further in section VIII, infra.
B. Exceptions.
Most reported state decisions concerning pre-1972 sound recordings addressed wide 
scale commercial copying and distribution. It is often not clear what other exceptions 
and limitations may be available under the various state laws because few cases address 
commercial, transformative uses or noncommercial uses.60 It seems reasonable to assume 
that state courts would apply fair use in appropriate circumstances, since the exception 
developed at common law61 accommodates First Amendment and other concerns. New 
York explicitly recognized a fair use defense as applied to the use of a pre-1972 sound 
recording.62 There are no established state common law doctrines analogous to other federal 
law exceptions, such as § 110(2) for distance education, or §108 for library and archive uses. 
On the other hand, in many states noncommercial activities such as uses for scholarship, 
teaching, preservation and so on would simply not meet the criteria for a cause of action 
under state law, since there is no commercial benefi t to the user.63  
C. Term of protection.
Under federal law, the term of protection for any given work depends on when the 
work was created or published; as indicated above, the general rule for term of protection 
of works created prior to 1978 is 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation, 
whichever expires fi rst.64 States are entitled – but not required – to protect pre-1972 sound 
recordings until 2067. A few states provide for a specifi c end date before 2067 for such 
protection, but most do not. 65 States are entitled to protect all pre-1972 sound recordings, 
no matter how old, until 2067. They are not required by federal law to move them into the 
public domain prior to that date. So while a musical composition published in 1922 went 
59. Flo & Eddie, supra note 53.
60. The California civil statute has exceptions, as do many state criminal laws, but they do not cover the 
range of uses for which exceptions are available under federal law. See Copyright Offi  ce Report, supra note 2, 
at 26-28.
61. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
62. See EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp., No. 601209/08, 2008 WL 5027245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 
8, 2008).
63. See Copyright Offi  ce Report, supra note 2, at 27; Jaszi Report, supra note 47, at 10-11.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 303(a). 
65. California, for example, protects sound recordings only until February 15, 2047. Cൺඅ. Cංඏ. Cඈൽൾ § 980(a)
(2) (West 1982). Colorado law provides that for the purposes of criminal enforcement, a common-law copyright 
may not last longer than 56 years from when it accrues. Cඈඅඈ. Rൾඏ. Sඍൺඍ. Aඇඇ. §18-4-601 (1.5) (2009). See 
generally Copyright Offi  ce Report, supra note 2, at 47. 2067 is eff ectively the end date in the many states that 
protect sound recordings pursuant to common law causes of action, for which claims there is often no specifi c 
end date under state law.
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into the public domain in 1997, a sound recording published the same year can be protected 
under state law until 2067.66
VI.  Tඁൾ Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ Oൿൿංർൾ Rൾඉඈඋඍ
Archivists and scholars, increasingly concerned about preservation of and access to 
pre-1972 sound recordings, have urged that pre-1972 sound recordings be brought under 
federal copyright law.67 They are concerned that the ambiguity of state law, coupled with the 
lengthy term of protection – potentially until 2067 – are impairing their ability to preserve 
these older recordings and make them available for study. In 2009, Congress charged 
the U.S. Copyright Offi  ce with studying whether pre-1972 sound recordings should be 
brought under federal law, and evaluating (i) the possible implications of such a change on 
preservation of and access to sound recordings, and (ii) the potential economic impact on 
right holders.68  The Offi  ce’s study took more than two years; its report, Federal Protection 
for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, was issued in December 2011. 69 In the report, the Offi  ce 
concluded that the best course is for Congress to federalize protection for pre-1972 
recordings. 
According to the Copyright Offi  ce, federalization “would best serve the interest of 
libraries, archives and others in preserving old sound recordings and increasing the 
availability to the public of old sound recordings.”70 Acknowledging that the scope of 
existing federal copyright exceptions is not always clear, the Offi  ce nonetheless decided 
that as a general matter, federal law would provide greater certainty and more opportunity 
to preserve old sound recordings and make them available to the public than the current 
patchwork of state laws does.71 In the Offi  ce’s view, the objections raised by the opponents 
of federalization could be satisfactorily addressed by drafting the legislation appropriately.72
Specifi cally, the Copyright Offi  ce recommended that:73 
66. See Capitol Records, Inc., supra note 48. Many states base protection on common law unfair competi-
tion principles, which have no temporal endpoint (other than the externally imposed federal preemption dead-
line of 2067), but protection would eff ectively cease if the sound recording at issue had no commercial value, 
so for any given recording, the term may eff ectively be shorter than 2067. 
67. See, e.g., Association for Recorded Sound Collections, Legal Impediments to Preservation of and Ac-
cess to the Audio Heritage of the United States: Recommendations by the Association for Recorded Sound 
Collections and the Music Library Association (Nov. 2, 2007), http://www.arsc-audio.org/pdf/ARSC-MLA-
copyright.pdf.
68. See Copyright Offi  ce Report, supra note 2, at vii. See also Lංൻඋൺඋඒ ඈൿ Cඈඇ඀උൾඌඌ, Nඈඍංർൾ ඈൿ Iඇඊඎංඋඒ, 
Fൾൽൾඋൺඅ Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ Pඋඈඍൾർඍංඈඇ ඈൿ Sඈඎඇൽ Rൾർඈඋൽංඇ඀ඌ Fංඑൾൽ Bൾൿඈඋൾ Fൾൻඋඎൺඋඒ 15, 1972, 75 Fൾൽ. Rൾ඀. 
67777 (Nඈඏ. 3, 2010).
69. See Copyright Offi  ce Report, supra note 2, at vii-4.
70. Id. at viii.
71. Id.
72. Id. 
73. Id. at ix-x.
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- Pre-1972 sound recordings should be brought under federal copyright law and given the 
same rights, exceptions and limitations as sound recordings created in 1972 and thereafter.
- The initial owner of the federal copyright should be the person who owns the rights in 
the recording under state law just prior to when the federal law becomes eff ective, so that 
federalization would not change ownership.
- The term of protection for the newly-federalized recordings would be 95 years from 
publication or, if the work is unpublished at the time of federalization, 120 years from 
fi xation.74 No pre-1972 sound recording would be protected beyond February 15, 2067. 75
- In cases where the federal term of protection would result in expiration of the copyright 
term prior to February 15, 2067, the following mechanisms would permit copyright owners 
to achieve a longer period of federal protection:
For sound recordings published in 1923 or later (or that have never been published at 
all), there would be a “transition period” of 6-10 years from the enactment of federal 
protection, during which the right holder would have to (i) make the sound recording 
available to the public at a reasonable price, and (ii) fi le a notice in the Copyright Offi  ce 
to verify it has done so and state its intent to achieve maximum protection. Provided the 
right holder (iii) continues to make the work available at a reasonable price, protection 
would last until February 15, 2067. (These requirements shall be referred to hereafter as 
the “extended term requirements.”)
For sound recordings published prior to 1923, the Report proposes a shorter transition 
period—three years from the enactment of federalizing legislation—during which a right 
holder would need to comply with extended term requirements. If the extended term 
requirements were met, the work could be protected for 25 years from enactment of the 
federalizing legislation. Otherwise, protection would expire at the end of the three-year 
transition period. 
- Finally, the Report recognized that adjustments should be considered with respect to 
the various federal requirements, e.g., timely registration as a prerequisite to an award of 
attorney’s fees and statutory damages in an infringement suit; 17 U.S.C. section 205, which 
deals with priority of confl icting transfers; and other provisions. 
VII.  Tඁൾ Pඈඍൾඇඍංൺඅ Tൺ඄ංඇ඀ඌ Iඌඌඎൾඌ
One looming issue is whether bringing state-protected sound recordings under federal law 
74. Id. at 165-66. The Offi  ce did not recommend a term that relied on a measuring life, due to the collabora-
tive nature of sound recordings and the diffi  culty, after many years, of determining length of protection based 
on one or more measuring lives. 
75. Id. 
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could amount to a “taking” of private property or a violation of due process rights under 
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.76 This issue could arise in various ways, but the 
greatest risk of such a claim in the scheme proposed by the Copyright Offi  ce deals with (1) 
who would own the newly federalized sound recordings and (2) the term of protection under 
federal law for such recordings. 77 
A. Ownership.
With respect to ownership, the concern is that in some cases the owner of the sound 
recording under state law might be diff erent than it would have been had the work been 
protected by federal copyright from the outset, and that federalization might therefore eff ect 
a change in ownership. If federalization were to result in a transfer of ownership, that could 
be problematic.  
It is true that the laws regarding ownership and transfers of rights in sound recordings 
may diff er between state and federal law. For example, under federal copyright law, where 
a work qualifi es as a work made for hire, it is the hiring party and not the individual creator 
who is the author for purposes of copyright law. 78 The scope of the work made for hire 
doctrine under federal law has varied over time. The extent to which any particular state 
would recognize a work made for hire doctrine equivalent to that of federal law at the 
relevant time with respect to pre-1972 sound recordings is unclear; often there are no cases 
on point. Accordingly, it is at least possible that in some cases the state law would hold that 
the hiring party is the owner and the federal law would hold that the human creators are the 
owners, or vice versa. 
Current federal copyright law makes clear that owning a physical copy of a copyright 
protected work is distinct from owning the underlying intellectual property rights. 
Transferring a copy – even if it is the only copy, or the best copy – also does not convey the 
underlying rights without an agreement. 79 In some states, however, the owner of the master 
recording might be deemed the owner of rights in the sound recording.80 
76. See Fifth Amendment, supra note 3.
77. For a more detailed discussion of the potential constitutional issues, see Eva E. Subotnik & June M. 
Besek, Constitutional Obstacles? Reconsidering Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 37 
Cඈඅඎආ. J. L. & Aඋඍඌ 327 (2014); Copyright Offi  ce Report, supra note 2, at 155-62.
78. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (b) (1978). For an explanation of work made for hire. Federal law prior to 1978 
also had a work made for hire doctrine, but it was more broadly applicable, see note 40, supra. For a detailed 
discussion of the work made for hire doctrine, see 1 Mൾඅඏංඅඅൾ B. Nංආආൾඋ & Dൺඏංൽ Nංආආൾඋ, Nංආආൾඋ ඈඇ Cඈඉඒ-
උං඀ඁඍ, § 5.03 [A], § 5.03 [B][1][ൺ][ං] (2014)
79. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
80. See, e.g., Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc., Inc., 39 N.E.2d 249, 251 (N.Y. 1942) (“[A]n artist must, 
if he wishes to retain or protect the reproduction right, make some reservation of that right when he sells the 
painting”). The “Pushman doctrine” was repudiated by statute in New York and California, at least for works 
of fi ne art. See 3 Nංආආൾඋ ඈඇ Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ, supra note 78, § 10.09 [B][1], [B][2]. A state court might apply this 
principle to pre-1972 sound recording masters.
146 IP THEORY   Volume 5:  Issue 1
So while it is far from certain, the application of federal law rather than state law to 
determine ownership of pre-1972 sound recordings could eff ect a change in ownership, 
upsetting existing business expectations. This potential problem could be avoided, however, 
if federalizing legislation were to explicitly provide that the legislation does not eff ect a 
change in ownership, and the initial owner of the federal copyright in these recordings 
should be determined by state law, as should the validity of any transfers made prior to the 
eff ective date of the legislation, as the Copyright Offi  ce Report recommends.81 
B. Term of Protection.
Any shortening of the term of protection by virtue of the transfer from state to federal 
law also has the potential to raise takings or due process claims. In the Copyright Offi  ce 
proposal, all pre-1972 sound recordings would get a term of protection of 95 years from 
publication; for unpublished works, 120 years from creation. For all sound recordings 
except those published prior to 1923, if the term would expire before 2067, the recording 
would nevertheless get at least 6-10 years of federal protection, and be eligible for federal 
protection until 2067 if the extended term requirements are met. In the context of real 
property, the Supreme Court has held that imposing conditions for maintaining rights is 
permissible, so it would seem that this scheme responds to taking concerns.82
The Copyright Offi  ce’s proposal for works fi rst published prior to 1923 diff ers, however, 
in that those works would not be eligible for protection until 2067. Those recordings would 
be eligible for a minimum of three years protection, and if the extended term requirements 
were met, they could get a maximum of 25 years of protection. Assuming that the legislation 
became eff ective on January 1, 2016, those recordings could be protected only until the end 
of 2040: they would lose 27 years of protection. However, given the age of those recordings 
(published before 1923), the fact that the vast majority likely have no commercial value, 
and the amount of time they have already enjoyed copyright protection, a successful takings 
claim seems remote. 
Another set of concerns about federalizing legislation relates to potential retroactivity. 
Such concerns arise where a law “attaches new legal consequences to conduct that took 
place prior to the law’s enactment.”83 Carefully drafting the legislation could eliminate any 
reasonable possibility of such claims. Congress could minimize any potential retroactive 
eff ect by making clear that federalization would have no eff ect on ownership; any 
termination provisions under federal law are applicable only to post-federalization grants;84 
81. See Copyright Offi  ce Report, supra note 2, at 139-49.
82. See, e.g., Subotnik & Besek, supra note 77, at 367-71.
83. Id. at 344.
84. See Copyright Offi  ce Report, supra note 2, at ix. Federal law provides that a grant of copyright rights 
made by an author on or after Jan. 1, 1978 may be terminated after 35 years, to allow the author or her heirs to 
renegotiate a grant that may have been made when the value of the work was not known. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) 
(2002). Certain grants with respect to works published prior to January 1, 1978 can be terminated under diff er-
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any claims concerning pre-1972 recordings existing at the time of federalization would 
be resolved under state law; and federal law applies only to post-federalization activities. 
Congress took this approach when it folded unpublished works protected by state law 
into federal copyright in 1976. Section 301 states that nothing in the federal copyright law 
annuls or limits state law rights or remedies with respect to “any cause of action arising 
from undertakings commenced before January 1, 1978.”85
In short, it does appear possible for Congress to federalize pre-1972 sound recordings 
without violating constitutional rights.
VIII.  Rൾർൾඇඍ Dൾඏൾඅඈඉආൾඇඍඌ
Since the Copyright Offi  ce Report was issued, a couple of bills concerning pre-1972 
sound recordings have been introduced in Congress, but neither has passed. 86 The issue 
was raised in hearings on music licensing conducted by the Subcommittee on Courts, 
Intellectual Property and the Internet of the House Committee on the Judiciary as part of its 
overall copyright review. So far the Subcommittee has not indicated which copyright issues 
it intends to focus on. 
The Copyright Offi  ce, meanwhile, has undertaken an in-depth study of music licensing; 
its Notice of Inquiry specifi cally addressed pre-1972 sound recordings, among other 
things.87 In the summer of 2014 the Offi  ce conducted a series of roundtable discussions on 
the issues raised by its Notice of Inquiry. The discussions provide helpful insight into why 
some stakeholders oppose federalizing pre-1972 sound recordings.
Participants in the roundtable discussions had various positions with respect to 
federalization of pre-1972 sound recordings. The predominant ones were: (1) there should 
be full federalization; (2) because full federalization would raise complicated issues 
that could only be worked out over time, the U.S. should pass legislation bringing pre-
1972 sound recordings into the section 114 statutory license, and deal with the rest of the 
ent conditions. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), (d) (2002).
85. 17 U.S.C. §301 (b)(2). See Golan v. Gonzales, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6800 at *50 (D. Colo. 2005) (hold-
ing URAA Section 514 not retroactive because though the provision “grants many retroactive benefi ts to au-
thors, it does not impose retroactive burdens upon the plaintiff s. This is because Section 514 does not impose 
upon the plaintiff s liability for, or new duties as a result of, their past conduct. Nor does Section 514 impair 
rights that the plaintiff s possessed when they acted. In short, Section 514 does not alter the legal consequences 
of the plaintiff s’ completed acts.” (citations omitted)).
86. E.g., RESPECT Act, H.R. 4772, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014) (to require that digital music services 
pay for the use of pre-1972 sound recordings in the same manner as they pay for sound recordings protected 
by federal copyright law); Sound Recording Simplifi cation Act, H.R. 2933, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (to 
amend the Copyright Act to allow Congress to legislate with respect to pre-1972 sound recordings).
87. See U.S. Copyright Offi  ce, Library of Congress, Music Licensing Study: Notice and Request for Public 
Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. 14739, 14742 (2014).
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federalization issues at some later time;88 or (3) federalizing pre-1972 sound recordings in 
the Copyright Act, or even just including them in the section 114 statutory license, is unfair; 
it would provide their creators with a windfall at the expense of those who stream digital 
music.
A. Full Federalization
A number of discussants at the Copyright Offi  ce’s music licensing roundtables argued 
for full federalization.89 There is no question that federalizing pre-1972 recordings raises 
some diffi  cult issues. They will not all be enumerated here; they are discussed at length 
in the Copyright Offi  ce’s study on pre-1972 sound recordings.90 The Offi  ce concluded, 
nevertheless, that these issues are “not insurmountable,”91 a conclusion with which I 
concur. For example, diffi  cult problems could arise if the federalization worked a change in 
ownership. However, if, as the Offi  ce suggests, the federalizing legislation were to provide 
that the owner of rights under federal law would be the owner under state law on the day 
before the federalizing legislation becomes eff ective, those issues would largely be avoided.  
On January 1, 1978, countless unpublished works were brought under federal copyright 
law pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 301, with relatively few problems. Admittedly there are 
additional issues that pertain to published works, but it is possible to work through them so 
that the goal of achieving a unitary copyright system is achieved and the stakeholders are 
fairly treated.92
B. The U.S. Should Pass Legislation Bringing Pre-1972 Sound Recordings into the 
Section 114 Statutory License Now, and Deal With the Rest of the Federalization 
Issues Later.
Some discussants argued in favor of dealing with the section 114 license now, and the 
other aspects of federalization later. 93 There are at least two problems with this approach. 
First, it appears to recognize a federal law right without corresponding exceptions. The 
Copyright Offi  ce Report was eff ectively initiated by libraries and archives that seek greater 
88. This is the approach of the RESPECT Act, supra note 86.
89. E.g., U.S. Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ Oൿൿංർൾ, Tඋൺඇඌർඋංඉඍ ඈൿ Mඎඌංർ Lංർൾඇඌංඇ඀ Sඍඎൽඒ Pඎൻඅංർ Rඈඎඇൽඍൺൻඅൾ 165-67 
(June 17, 2014) (comments of Eric Harbeson); 162-64 (comments of Ilene Goldberg), available at http://copy-
right.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/transcripts/mls-la-transcript06172014.pdf.
90. See generally Copyright Offi  ce Report, supra note 2, at 139-74.
91. Id. at viii.
92. See generally Subotnik & Besek, supra note 77.
93. E.g., U.S. Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ Oൿൿංർൾ, Tඋൺඇඌർඋංඉඍ ඈൿ Mඎඌංർ Lංർൾඇඌංඇ඀ Sඍඎൽඒ Pඎൻඅංർ Rඈඎඇൽඍൺൻඅൾ 149-50 
(June 5, 2014) [hereinafter Public Roundtable June 5] (comments of Dean Marks) available at http://copyright.
gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/transcripts/mls-nashville-transcript06052014.pdf; U.S. Cඈඉඒඋං඀ඁඍ Oൿൿංർൾ, 
Tඋൺඇඌർඋංඉඍ ඈൿ Mඎඌංർ Lංർൾඇඌංඇ඀ Sඍඎൽඒ Pඎൻඅංർ Rඈඎඇൽඍൺൻඅൾ 172-73 (June 24, 2014) [hereinafter Public 
Roundtable June 24] (comments of Colin Rushing), available at http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensing-
study/transcripts/mls-nyc-transcript06242014.pdf. .
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clarity in governing laws in order to better achieve preservation and scholarly uses of 
pre-1972 sound recordings. The “114 only” approach is aimed primarily at commercial 
recordings, and does little to respond to the legitimate concerns of libraries and archives. 
Second, it is not clear that the complications of full federalization can be avoided by this 
route. For example, doesn’t one still have to determine ownership under this approach? 
Moreover, it would not obviate questions about termination rights, takings or the like.
C. Federalization Would Create a Windfall for Creators.
Some discussants argued that including pre-1972 sound recordings in the Copyright Act, 
and in particular, in the section 114 statutory license, would provide their creators with a 
windfall.94 
It is true that creators of pre-1972 sound recordings had no expectation of a performance 
right in digital audio transmissions when they created their works. At the same time, they 
did have an expectation of continuing to earn revenue from sales of copies (phonorecords) 
of their sound recordings. The market has changed in a way that few if any persons could 
have envisioned; increasingly, sound recordings are exploited through digital streaming 
rather than through distribution of copies. Accordingly, allowing the creators to benefi t from 
the streaming of their recordings is not a windfall.  
Some discussants also argued that the creators of pre-1972 sound recordings should not 
benefi t from this new market because it could not have acted as an incentive to the creation 
of these recordings.95 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this “quid pro quo” theory in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft.96 Moreover, the benefi ts of full federalization along the lines proposed by 
the Copyright Offi  ce in its report would accrue not only, or even primarily, to right holders 
of pre-1972 sound recordings, but also to scholars, researchers, libraries, archives and other 
users of these recordings.
Since the music licensing roundtable discussions, there has been a state law case that 
will likely lead to greater disarray in the laws governing pre-1972 sound recordings. In Flo 
& Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., the federal district court for the Central District of 
California concluded that California state law provided a public performance right in sound 
recordings created by “The Turtles” in the 1960s.97 It held that Sirius XM violated plaintiff s’ 
rights under state law by transmitting the Turtles’ recordings over its satellite and internet 
radio services.98
94. E.g., Public Roundtable June 24, supra note 93, at 174-75 (comments of Bruce Rich); Public Roundtable 
June 5, supra note 93, at 170 (comments of David Oxenford).
95. E.g., Public Roundtable June 24, supra note 93, at 175-76 (comments of Bruce Rich); Public Round-
table June 5, supra note 93, at 169-70 (comments of David Oxenford).
96. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214-17 (2003). 
97. Flo & Eddie, supra note 53.  
98. The court held that Sirius XM’s transmissions violated Cal. Civ. Code §980(a)(2) (West 1982) as well 
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The court recognized a full public performance right that apparently would permit sound 
recording owners to enforce against non-digital performances, such as those by radio 
stations’ terrestrial broadcasts. It never directly addressed the fact that since the time sound 
recordings were commercially exploited until the present, music industry stakeholders have 
been conducting themselves as though no such right exists. According to the court, the issue 
of whether there is a state law public performance right for pre-1972 sound recordings had 
never been squarely presented to a California court before.99
This ruling, which recognizes a state law performance right that exceeds the scope of 
federal rights in sound recordings, will certainly create controversy and is likely to be 
appealed. Owners of federally protected sound recordings have repeatedly sought to extend 
the public performance right in sound recording to terrestrial broadcasts, but broadcasters 
have been fi rm in their opposition. This holding will undoubtedly be appealed, but if it 
stands it could lead to greater support for incorporating pre-1972 sound recordings into 
federal copyright law from terrestrial broadcasters and from users who seek relief from the 
increasingly confusing array of state laws.
Cඈඇർඅඎඌංඈඇ
Pre-1972 sound recordings are currently protected by a patchwork of state laws. 
Legislation to make all pre-1972 recordings subject to federal copyright law (including the 
section 114 statutory license) would eliminate the disparate sources of protection for these 
recordings and the necessity to consult the inconsistent and sometimes hard to discern state 
laws to determine whether pre-1972 sound recordings may permissibly be used.  At the 
same time, it would reduce the disparate treatment of domestic pre-1972 sound recordings 
and foreign pre-1972 sound recordings whose U.S. copyrights have been restored.100
Federalization would enable archiving and other scholarly research and use that is 
currently hampered by the lack of discernable, consistent exceptions among the states, as 
well as terms of protection under state law that can extend until 2067. One of goals of those 
who sought the sound recording study was to be able to preserve and provide access to old 
recordings. 
Finally, federalization of pre-1972 sound recordings would reduce confusion. One cannot 
always readily determine if a particular recording is protected by state law, by federal 
copyright law as a restored work, or by federal copyright law as a protected derivative work. 
Federalizing pre-1972 sound recordings raises some tricky issues, but those issues can be 
overcome by careful drafting, in particular to ensure that federalization does not eff ect a 
as Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (West 1992) (unfair competition and common law misappropriation). It de-
clined to rule on summary judgment as to whether Sirius XM made infringing reproductions. 
99. Flo & Eddie, supra note 53, at *15.  
100. See supra note 16.
